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The notion of working memory (WM) was introduced to account for the usage of short-
term memory resources by other cognitive tasks such as reasoning, mental arithmetic,
language comprehension, and many others. This collaboration between memory and
other cognitive tasks can only be achieved by a dedicated WM system that controls
task coordination. To that end, WM models include executive control. Nevertheless, other
attention control systems may be involved in coordination of memory and cognitive tasks
calling on memory resources. The present paper briefly reviews the evidence concerning
the role of selective attention in WM activities. A model is proposed in which selective
attention control is directly linked to the executive control part of the WM system.
The model assumes that apart from storage of declarative information, the system also
includes an executive WM module that represents the current task set. Control processes
are automatically triggered when particular conditions in these modules are met. As each
task set represents the parameter settings and the actions needed to achieve the task
goal, it will depend on the specific settings and actions whether selective attention control
will have to be shared among the active tasks. Only when such sharing is required, task
performance will be affected by the capacity limits of the control system involved.
Keywords: working memory, selective attention, executive control, executive attention, task-set switching
INTRODUCTION
It seems self-evident that the likelihood of successfully recalling
a previously observed sequence of events will be larger when
attention was than when it was not selectively oriented towards
these events. Nevertheless, theories of working memory (WM)
have been focusing on executive attention rather than on other
kinds of attention like orienting attention, which is a main
constituent of selective attention tasks. Furthermore, the evi-
dence in support of a role for orienting or selective attention
in WM has not been settled, and it remains an open question
whether selective attention is indeed an indispensable aspect of
WM. The presumption that selective attention plays a central
role in WM is certainly tempting. The present article scrutinizes
this hypothesis by reviewing the behavioral evidence regarding
interactions between selective and executive attention in tasks
taxing WM. This review will be restricted to studies relevant
to the interaction of both kinds of attention and will therefore
not be completely representative. In preview, the paper will
show that both kinds of attention have a symbiotic relationship
within WM.
At this point, it seems appropriate to provide some delineation
of the attention categories involved in the present article. The
term selective attention typically refers to the kind of processing
involved in orienting attention towards a specific set of entities
or representations while ignoring others. Such processing may be
driven either by more automatic or by more top-down controlled
processing (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider,
1977; Neuman, 1984). Executive attention, in contrast, refers to
attention processing related to responding and task execution.
Research on selective attention relies on a range of tasks that are
known as selective attention tasks. However, rarely ever a task is
process-pure and, in fact, many of the selective attention tasks
also involve executive attention processes, as will become clear
later in this article. In the literature, a range of terms, such as
executive control, execution function, and cognitive control has been
used interchangeably to refer to the kind of attention involved in
control of action. In the present article no strict distinction will be
made between these terms.
WORKING MEMORY: EXECUTIVE ATTENTION AND CONTROL
The concept of WM finds its origin in the context of research on
short-term memory. Originally, the short-term memory system
(STS) was believed to temporarily maintain incoming informa-
tion before it is transferred to the (episodic) long-term memory
system. These ideas were expressed in a range of short-term
memory models published in the 1960s and 1970s; the most
representative of these models was the so-called “modal model”
proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). Although in this
conception the STS was essentially a (passive) store, it was also
endowed with so-called control processes, such as coding and
rehearsal. These control processes allow active restructuring of
the information with the aim of increasing the memory system’s
efficiency, and presumably require attention. Later on, the idea
that the STS can also be used to temporarily maintain information
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in the service of other activities gradually gained ground. If
control processes like rehearsal, coding, etc., are useful to improve
long-term recall, these processes should also help short-term
recall, as in looking up a phone number in the directory to make
an immediate call (without the intention of remembering the
phone number an hour or a day later). But no doubt, temporary
storage of a piece of information can also be useful in other
tasks, such as carrying or borrowing in mental arithmetic (e.g.,
Hitch, 1978; Imbo et al., 2007), or to maintain the premises into
focus to reach a conclusion (e.g., Vandierendonck and De Vooght,
1997).
In fact, the consideration that short-term memory storage
can be at the service of other tasks required a new approach
to the study of temporary memory. For the study of STS, an
examination of its performance in free recall was a suitable
methodology. In contrast, an investigation of the properties of
a memory system that provides services to other tasks, required
a methodology in which the limiting capacities of the memory
system can be measured in situations requiring different amounts
of temporary storage in the service of another task. This resulted
in two methodological changes. First, instead of free recall, serial
recall became the standard method to measure the limits of the
memory system because it is less vulnerable to familiarity-based
recollections. Second, in order to examine memory-consumption
by another task, a dual-task methodology was required. In such a
methodology, typically a memory task is performed concurrently
with another cognitive task that allegedly requires memory for
its execution. On the basis of these methodological innovations,
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) showed that the WM system had to
provide flexible storage facilities supervised by a controlling agent;
for this supervision they borrowed the notion of central executive
from artificial intelligence research.
The framework introduced by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) can
best be qualified as a multi-component WM. It originally con-
sisted of two modality-specific slave systems (phonological loop
and visuospatial WM) supervised by the central executive. This
framework stimulated a large amount of research on WM. Apart
from a range of new models on the storage facilities provided by
the WM system (e.g., Logie, 1986, 1995; Hulme et al., 1991; Page
and Norris, 1998, 2009; Burgess and Hitch, 1999, 2006; Brown
et al., 2000), an approach to measure individual differences in
WM capacity showed the importance of WM in processes such
as reading (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980, 1983), counting (Case
et al., 1982), mental arithmetic (Turner and Engle, 1989), and the
relation of WM to intelligence (Engle et al., 1999). As research
progressed and the number of dual-task studies increased, the
call for fractionation of the central executive sounded louder
(Baddeley, 1996a,b) and attempts to redefine this agent as a
collection of executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000) or to recast
the executive in terms of more basic executive processes (e.g.,
Szmalec et al., 2005; Vandierendonck et al., 2007, 2008) were
published.
In all these studies, the role of attention was central. However,
of the different attention networks distinguished by Posner (e.g.,
Posner and Petersen, 1990; Posner and Rothbart, 2007; Petersen
and Posner, 2012) only the executive network is included in most
present-day WM theories. This is completely consistent with the
position that the role of the central executive corresponds with
the supervisory attention model of Norman and Shallice (1986),
which also basically requires the executive attention network to
control actions. The question may be raised whether the WM
system also calls on one or more of the other attention networks.
In what follows, the utility of broadening the attention scope of
theories of WM is further investigated. First, the breadth of the
executive attention basis of WM theories is explored by a review
of different attention tasks that are modulated by WM capacity.
Next, attentional selectivity or orienting attention is considered,
by briefly reviewing the evidence. Finally, an attempt is presented
to integrate all these findings in a comprehensive view of the
attentional basis of WM.
ATTENTION ANDWORKING MEMORY
To test whether WM includes particular forms of attention,
basically two methodologies can be used. On the one hand, it
is possible to use the traditional dual-task method in which two
tasks calling on a particular resource are performed concurrently.
When performance on either or both tasks is impaired compared
to a single-task execution of these tasks, it follows that they are
competing for this particular resource. In contrast, when two tasks
allegedly tax different resources, concurrent performance of these
tasks is not expected to result in performance impairments. Thus,
a double dissociation can be established (e.g., Klauer and Zhao,
2004). On the other hand, an individual differences approach
can be applied by selecting a group of participants with a high
and a group with a low working-memory capacity (often top
and bottom 25% of the distribution) as measured by one of the
many dedicated WM span tasks (e.g., Daneman and Carpenter,
1980, 1983; Turner and Engle, 1989). If the factor of WM capacity
interacts with a difficulty variation on the other task in such a way
that the low capacity group’s performance suffers more from the
difficulty variation than that of the high capacity group, it follows
that the second task requires more WM capacity.
In the present section, the focus is on a range of attention tasks
that require orienting towards or selection of particular stimuli
that also require participants to ignore irrelevant or previously
relevant stimuli. These tasks are known to involve controlled
attention. As this term is sometimes used as a synonym for
executive control, it seems quite likely that these tasks call on WM
or tax some common resources or processes. In what follows,
mostly behavioral studies are considered, although occasionally
ERP findings are discussed as well. A useful review of electrophysi-
ological studies of the relationship between selective attention and
WM can be found in Gazzaley and Nobre (2012).
STROOP TASK
Many attentional tasks require some form of control for their
execution. Consider, for example, the Stroop (1935) task. In the
standard form of the task, participants are shown words and are
requested to name the color of the print. In incongruent trials,
color words are presented shown in a color incongruent with the
word meaning. Congruent trials consist of words in which the
print color and the word name match. Sometimes, also neutral
trials are shown in which the print color of a non-color word has
to be named. In order to produce a correct answer, the relevant
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feature (print color) must be selected. In incongruent trials this
is difficult because the irrelevant feature (the word meaning) is
accessed automatically. The ensuing conflict must be resolved,
which leads to slower and more error-prone responding. More
particularly, the responses are slower than on congruent and
neutral trials. Usually congruent and incongruent trials are mixed,
and typically incongruent trials are slower when they are less
frequent (MacLeod, 1991).
Several studies have shown that low-span participants show
a larger Stroop interference effect (i.e., slower and more error-
prone responding to incongruent than to congruent and neutral
trials) than the high-span participants (Long and Prat, 2002; Kane
and Engle, 2003; Kiefer et al., 2005; Meier and Kane, 2013). This
difference is also modulated by the frequency of incongruent trials
and the order in which blocks with few and many incongruent
trials are presented. This is taken as evidence that high-span
subjects are better able to keep the task goal active in WM (Kane
and Engle, 2003; Morey et al., 2012).
In a series of experiments, Kim et al. (2005) varied the modal-
ity of the WM load. Thus they observed increased interference
when the WM load and Stroop task were in the same modality
(e.g., both verbal), no interference effect when the WM load was
in a modality different from the Stroop task (e.g., verbal Stroop
task with visuospatial WM load), and decreased interference
when the WM load was in the same modality as the distracter
of the Stroop task (e.g., both verbal). Other studies focused on
modulation of post-conflict control. A study by Soutschek et al.
(2013), for example, shows that a concurrent WM load modulates
the post-conflict control. Over three experiments, different types
of WM load were applied. When the WM task was an arithmetic
updating task or an n-back task, but not when the WM task
was a simple load task (recall a number of digits), the interac-
tion of current trial congruency by previous trial congruency,
which is a marker of post-conflict adaptation (Botvinick et al.,
2001), was modulated by the WM load. In other words, the
requirement to update WM contents depletes WM attentional
resources to such an extent that it is no longer possible to
perform control adjustments after an incongruent Stroop trial;
simply maintaining a series of up to six digits does not have this
effect.
FLANKER TASK
In the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), participants are
requested to categorize a central stimulus with a left or right key-
press, while it is flanked by either compatible or incompatible
stimuli. As an example, consider a central stimulus (left or right
arrow) flanked by two stimuli on the left and two on the right; the
flankers are also arrows, either all left pointing or all right point-
ing. When the flankers are compatible with the central stimulus
(e.g., arrows pointing in the same direction), responses are faster
than when the flankers are incompatible (Flanker Compatibility
Effect, FCE). When stimulus and flankers are compatible they
all favor the same response, but when they are incompatible
they favor conflicting responses resulting in a slower response
and a larger likelihood of an error. As in the Stroop task, also
in the Flanker task, post-conflict adjustment has been observed
(Botvinick et al., 2001).
Lavie et al. (2004) showed in a series of experiments that
the FCE was more increased under a larger WM load. Pratt
et al. (2011) compared flanker performance on an arrow-flanker
task under single-task and dual-task conditions while recording
early and late attention-sensitive event-related potentials (P1 and
P300). In the dual-task condition, a memory load of 4 or 7
items (Sternberg task; Sternberg, 1966) was presented for later
recall and during the retention interval a number of flanker
trials were presented. The FCE was observed, and it was reduced
under both load conditions. P300 amplitude to incompatible
trials was also reduced under dual-task conditions. These findings
suggest that under WM load it was more difficult to suppress
interference from the incompatible flankers. The observation that
P1 amplitude was reduced on all dual-task flanker (compatible
and incompatible) trials showed that increased WM demands
reduce top-down attentional control over early visual processing.
A general FCE was also confirmed in a correlational study with
structural equation modeling (Keye et al., 2009). This study also
tested the role of WM in post-conflict adjustment, but could not
confirm this role.
NEGATIVE PRIMING
When the presently relevant stimulus was present but irrelevant
on the previous trial, it is said that the present stimulus is
negatively primed. This results in a slower response to the relevant
stimulus compared to a neutral situation where the stimulus was
not present on the previous trial (Tipper, 1985; Tipper and Driver,
1988). Note that negative priming is the opposite of repetition
priming where the previous and the current relevant stimulus are
the same. Agreement about the mechanism behind negative prim-
ing is still lacking, but the competition between representations or
processes linked to the previous (ignored event) and the present
(relevant) event is part of most accounts. For that reason, it is
likely that WM modulates negative priming.
This was confirmed in a study with negative priming in a letter-
naming task under a range of conditions that varied the WM
load from 0 to 4 words that were presented for later recall (Engle
et al., 1995). Under loads 0–2, negative priming was present, but
it became gradually smaller and disappeared completely from
load 3 on. Because both the negative priming task and the
WM load were verbal, it is possible that this result is due to a
domain-specific interference. This was tested in another study
that included both verbal and visuospatial WM loads (Conway
et al., 1999). Two experiments used letter naming to investigate
negative priming, combined with a WM load of 0–4 words in
the first experiment and visuospatial WM load of 0–4 polygons
in the second experiment. In addition, the participants were
classified as low or high WM span on the basis of the opera-
tion span (OSPAN; Turner and Engle, 1989). Both experiments
revealed the presence of negative priming, but this effect was
only significant at load 0, irrespective of the type of WM load.
It was also expected that the high-span participants would show
more negative priming than the low-spans. The rationale for
this expectation is that negative priming is the result of coping
with interference and that high-span subjects are better able to
handle interference. This expectation was also confirmed in the
observation that only high-spans showed a negative priming effect
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at load 0, whereas low-spans showed no negative priming effect
at all.
Long and Prat (2002) reported similar findings. One of their
experiments concerning color word Stroop stimuli has been
mentioned in the section of Stroop Tasks (above). In another
experiment, they also used Stroop stimuli and compared neutral
trials with incongruent trials, half of which were conflict trials
(incongruent color word pairs) and the other half were negative
priming trials where the previously ignored word was the color
name of the present trial. In high-span participants, no naming
latency difference was observed between neutral trials and conflict
trials; this confirms the earlier reported findings about the Stroop
interference effect. Negative priming (the RT difference between
conflict trials and negative priming trials) was very high. In
contrast, low spans showed a large Stroop interference effect and
a small, but reliable negative priming effect. These findings cor-
roborate earlier findings about Stroop interference and they are
consistent with the findings reported by Conway and colleagues
regarding negative priming (Engle et al., 1995; Conway et al.,
1999).
It should also be noted that in contrast to identity-based
negative priming as in all these reviewed studies, location-based
negative priming is not affected by either a visuospatial or a
verbal WM load (Kahan et al., 2013). Unfortunately, this study
is not very convincing because the so-called memory load (of
three items) was presented at a rate of 350 ms per item (300 ms
on, 50 ms off), and the memory test did not require to recall or
to recognize any of the items specifically; instead a judgment of
frequency was asked (more even or odd numbers for the verbal
load e.g.). The finding that such a load does not remove location-
based negative priming does not seem to allow strong statements
about the role of WM in location-based priming.
ATTENTIONAL BLINK
The attentional blink refers to an impaired ability to detect a sec-
ond target during an interval of about 400–600 ms after detecting
a first target (Raymond et al., 1992). The typical procedure for
detecting the attentional blink consists of a rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) of letters in which a letter is shown every
100 ms (the exact value varies slightly over studies). One letter is
in a different color (e.g., white instead of black) and occurs as the
first target (T1); on part of the trials a second target (e.g., X; T2)
occurs in the same color as all the other letters and at the end of
the series (usually about 20 letters), the question whether T2 was
or was not present is to be answered. T2 is presented at various
positions after T1. When presented on positions 2–7 after T1, the
frequency of detecting T2 decreases; when presented immediately
after T1, detection frequency is not impaired. There is a large
literature on the attentional blink and many of the task parameters
have been varied (rate of presentation, usage of additional targets,
visual and verbal memory loads, etc.), sometimes leading to
surprising outcomes.
Some studies have used a WM load while performing the
RSVP-attentional blink task. The findings of these studies are
somewhat variable, but some studies found no variation in the
size of the attentional blink effect with increased memory load,
although the memory load affected some performance aspects
(e.g., Akyürek and Hommel, 2005, 2006). However, when par-
ticipants had to judge whether T1 is part of the WM load, the
attentional blink increased (Akyürek et al., 2007). Other studies
measured WM capacity by means of the OSPAN and found that
the attentional blink was decreased with higher WM capacity
(Arnell et al., 2010) and that this was even the case when Raven’s
standard progressive matrices scores were partialed out (Colzato
et al., 2007).
STIMULUS-RESPONSE COMPATIBILITY
When stimulus features or dimensions overlap with response
features or dimensions, stimulus-response compatibility (S-R
compatibility) is bound to occur. Two types of S-R compatibility
(see Kornblum et al., 1990) are of primary interest here, namely
compatibility due to an overlap between the relevant stimulus
and response dimensions (e.g., respond left to a left positioned or
left-pointing stimulus) which is also known as S-R compatibility
proper, and compatibility due to an overlap between an irrele-
vant stimulus dimension and the relevant response dimension.
The Simon effect (e.g., Simon and Rudell, 1967) is an example
of the latter: consider the request to respond with a left key-
press to a red circle and to respond right to a green circle,
responses will be faster if the red circle is positioned on the
left side of the screen compared to when it is positioned on
the right. Position on the screen is here irrelevant, but it affects
responding. Both types of compatibility require action control,
which is one of the typical expressions of executive control.
Performance on such S-R compatibility tasks is therefore expected
to be related to WM capacity or WM load. A few published
studies are relevant to this issue, most of them concern the Simon
effect.
There is a lot of variability in the methodologies used in
these studies, which makes it difficult to extract a clear pattern
of findings. Some studies report no or only a modest effect of
a memory load on the Simon effect (Stins et al., 2004; Stürmer
et al., 2005), whereas other studies found some effects (Zhao
et al., 2010; Wühr and Biebl, 2011). It seems quite likely that the
Simon effect is not very susceptible to WM load, especially as it
seems rather easy to reverse the Simon effect (Notebaert et al.,
2006). It is probably more interesting to follow the logic applied
in studies of the Stroop effect and the FCE, and to look at conflict
adaptation. Weldon et al. (2013) measured WM capacity in a
Simon experiment. WM capacity was not related to performance
on the Simon task, but a measure of the magnitude of the trial-by-
trial conflict adaptation correlated negatively with WM capacity
for low-span and near 0 for high-span participants.
INTERIM CONCLUSION
In this section, attention tasks were considered that involve both
selection and control. A common theme among these tasks and
the way they are performed is that in the selection of the relevant
stimulus feature and consequently in performing the correct
response, some form of conflict or competition between processes
occurs that may cause erroneous and/or delayed responses. This is
the case for the Stroop interference effect, the flanker compatibil-
ity effect, and the Simon effect. Incongruent or incompatible trials
in each of these are based on a competition between irrelevant and
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relevant stimulus features or dimensions. In a particular respect,
negative priming is similar, because a previously irrelevant stim-
ulus becomes now relevant and as a consequence the action cou-
pled to the stimulus has to be changed, creating a conflict between
the old and the new action link. Only the attentional blink seems
to be different, but it may be too early to draw conclusions on
the underlying processes. In all these cases, attentional control
is needed, and the evidence shows that the observed interference
and its control (sometimes in a trial-by-trial conflict adjustment)
is modulated by the individual’s amount of WM capacity and
that increases of WM load modulate the observed effects. As
a temporary conclusion, it may be said that all these forms of
attention are mediated by WM or are at least calling on processes
that are shared with WM.
WORKING MEMORY AND VISUAL SEARCH
In the present section, the focus is on selective attention tasks
of which it is not clear that they involve executive attention. In
particular, some forms of perceptual selectivity will be considered,
such as attentional capture, visual (perceptual) search and envi-
ronmental monitoring. In all these tasks, participants are given
the instruction to search for a particular target. Usually this target
is only briefly presented or described before the start of the search;
therefore, it must be assumed that the searched-for object is active
in WM.
ATTENTIONAL CAPTURE
Sometimes particular events stand out and capture attention so-
to-speak automatically. For example, a single poppy in a lawn
will be noticed immediately. Hence, searching for a singleton
(stimulus with unique features) is rather easy, such as finding a red
circle among green circles and squares. However, if the object of
the search is to find the green square among green circles and one
single red circle (irrelevant singleton), finding the target object
may be hampered by the presence of the irrelevant singleton. The
question is now considered whether such searches are mediated
by WM.
Lavie and de Fockert (2005) used a search task where nine
figures (circles and diamonds) were arranged in a circular lay
out. All the figures were shown in red on a black background,
except for an irrelevant color singleton (green circle) that was
present on some trials. Each figure contained either a horizontal
or a tilted line. The stimuli were presented for 200 ms and the
requirement was to find the red circle among the red diamonds
(and occasional green circle) and to decide on the orientation of
the line. This task was performed either alone or in a dual-task
situation with a verbal WM load (six digits). Search was slowed by
the presence of the singleton, and this effect was augmented under
load. This observation was further corroborated in an event-
related fMRI study that showed that the presence of the singleton
was associated with higher superior parietal activation (in line
with a capture account) and higher frontal activity (Lavie and de
Fockert, 2006). Behavioral singleton interference correlated with
the frontal activity, and singleton interference was also higher
under WM load.
Further specifications of the relationship between WM and
attentional capture come from studies that used other types of
WM load. One study used only a visual WM load and con-
firmed the finding that the presence of the WM load increased
the singleton interference (Olivers et al., 2006). This study also
observed that the effect was stronger when the irrelevant singleton
overlapped with the WM load but only when difficult to verbalize
pictures were used. A study of Burnham et al. (2014) explic-
itly tested the role of different WM components in attentional
capture. They found that only tasks that tax visuospatial WM
and executive control increased distracter interference, while a
phonological WM load did not affect capture.
VISUAL SEARCH
It thus seems that in at least some visual search tasks, a WM load
modulates performance. Can these observations be generalized
to other types of visual or perceptual search? A study by Kane
et al. (2006) examined the relationship between WM capacity and
visual search. In three experiments the investigators selected high
and low complex span participants to perform a series of visual
search tasks in which speed of response and search errors were
registered. In the first experiment, participants searched a letter
F among distracters (efficient search with letters O as distracter;
inefficient search with letters E as distracter); set size, presence of
the target, and organization of the layout were varied. Although
strong and reliable search RT slopes were observed, WM span did
not affect performance. In the second experiment, a similar design
was used in which participants searched either for a red vertical
line among green vertical lines and red and green horizontal lines
(conjunction search) or for an F among E and 90◦ tilted T’s
(spatial configuration search) in different set sizes. Again, reliable
RT slopes were observed, but WM span did not affect or modulate
the findings. In the final experiment, participants had to detect an
F (regular or mirrored) among regular and mirrored E’s and T’s
tilted 90◦ forward or backward. All the symbols were presented
on three concentric rings at eight equally spread positions over
the rings. Search was to be performed in two different ways.
In one condition, the participants were requested to perform a
search of the middle ring starting at the top (12 o’clock) position
and following the positions clockwise until they found the first
F (regular or mirrored; there could be more than one F). In
the other condition, search was not constrained but was aimed
to find the F on the middle ring (there was only one F on
this ring). The constrained search (command search) was used
because it had been reported that such search requires volition
and is much slower than standard search (Wolfe et al., 2000).
The command search was indeed slower than the unconstrained
search, but again WM span did not affect neither modulate
performance. These findings led Kane et al. (2006) to conclude
that the executive control function of WM does not “generalize
to difficult attention tasks lacking the need to actively maintain
goals to restrain prepotent responses or constrain attentional
focus to particular stimuli or locations in space amid distractors”
(p. 771).
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the scope of these
findings. Indeed, the already reported attentional capture studies
show that search performance is affected by a WM load, in a task
that is not dramatically different from the ones used by Kane et al.
(2006). These authors themselves, moreover, remark that several
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dual-task studies did report effects of WM load on visual attention
tasks (e.g., Woodman and Luck, 2004). Anderson et al. (2008)
report a dual-task study of efficient and inefficient search per-
formance. Participants were presented 4 or 10 randomly rotated
L’s in a circular arrangement with the request to decide whether
a target X (efficient search) or T (inefficient search) was present
or not. The search task was performed in isolation or within the
retention interval of a WM task with either a low (3 items) or
a high load (5 items). Inefficient search, but not efficient search,
was affected by the size of the memory load. This was the case
for a spatial WM load as well as for a verbal WM load. These
findings clearly show that at least inefficient visual search calls
on domain-general WM resources. Given that this study used a
task that is quite similar to one of the tasks used by Kane et al.
the possibility that the correlational methodology used by these
authors may be less sensitive to detecting WM modulation in
visual search.
Findings like these may strengthen the impression that the
methodology used (correlational or dual-task) plays an important
role. No doubt, there are important differences between these
methodologies (e.g., Logie, 2011), and the possibility that the
correlational methodology used by these authors may be less
sensitive to detecting WM modulation in visual search should not
be rejected on a priori grounds. Yet, small changes to the design
may result in different findings. Sobel et al. (2007) made some
changes to the conjunction search task used by Kane et al. (2006)
in order to allow a distinction between bottom-up and top-down
search mechanisms. They found that searches based on bottom-
up processes were not related to WM capacity, but searches based
on top-down processes were performed better by high-span than
by low-span participants.
That small changes to the design may indeed affect the results
was also shown in a more recent study of Poole and Kane (2009).
They presented target location cues for 1–8 target positions either
followed by a long (1500 ms) or a short (30 ms) interval before
the (inefficient) search display was shown. They found that high-
span participants identified targets (F or mirrored F) faster than
low-span subjects, but only when distracters were present on non-
target positions, and only with long cue-stimulus intervals. Thus
it seems that individual differences in visual search performance
are only related to individual differences in WM capacity when it
is necessary to maintain the search focus over a longer period and
when distracters at non-focused positions are present.
INPUT MONITORING
Another aspect of search behavior is found in situations where
the environment is monitored or scanned for the occurrence
of a particular event, this is also known as input monitor-
ing. On the basis of a conceptual analysis, Vandierendonck
(2000a,b) proposed that input monitoring could be one of the
more basic processes underlying executive control. In order to
test the role of input monitoring, it was assumed that events
occurring randomly distributed over time required more input
monitoring effort than events occurring in a fixed time schedule.
The rationale for this was that a fixed time schedule may be
handled by automatic processes, while for randomly occurring
events the monitoring process must be continuously adapted.
Deschuyteneer and Vandierendonck (2005) investigated mental
arithmetic performance (simple sums) while concurrently and
continuously another task had to be performed that varied the
degree of input monitoring and the involvement of response
selection. These two variations were crossed. The secondary task
consisted of high or low tones that were presented at a fixed tempo
(1 tone every 1200 ms) or in an unpredictable tempo (random
alternation of 900 and 1500 ms). Each tone required a response.
In the simple response condition, one single response was to be
emitted as soon as a tone was presented; in the response selection
condition, low and high tones were responded to each with their
associated response. The answer time to the arithmetic sums
was slowed when a response selection was required compared
to the requirement to produce a simple response. In contrast,
answer times were not significantly different for fixed and random
schedules of tone presentation, indicating that input monitoring
is not part of the attentional resources required to execute the
arithmetic sums. As it has been shown before that such sums
call on WM (Hitch, 1978; Lemaire et al., 1996) and more specif-
ically, on the executive control system (De Rammelaere et al.,
1999, 2001; De Rammelaere and Vandierendonck, 2001; Imbo
et al., 2005), these findings do not corroborate the hypothesis
that input monitoring is part of executive control. In a similar
study with calculation of arithmetic products as the primary task,
these findings were confirmed: concurrent response selection but
not concurrent input monitoring affected performance on the
arithmetic task.
The hypothesis that input monitoring is part of executive
control was also tested with saccades as primary task. Several
studies have shown that anti-saccades (eye-movements away from
a peripheral stimulus) but not pro-saccades (eye-movements
towards a peripheral stimulus) call on WM’s executive system
(e.g., Roberts et al., 1994; Stuyven et al., 2000; Kane et al.,
2001). Vandierendonck et al. (2008) compared pro-saccade and
anti-saccade execution either in a single-task condition or in
a dual-task condition with a concurrent and continuous tone
response task. There were four dual-task conditions resulting
from orthogonal parametric variations in input monitoring and
response selection (fixed vs. random tone intervals and simple
or choice reaction task). Both pro- and anti-saccades suffered
from a non-specific dual-task cost, but more interestingly, nei-
ther input monitoring nor response selection played any role
in pro-saccades which are generally believed to be triggered
automatically (Hallett, 1978; Kristjánsson et al., 2001), whereas
anti-saccades were not only slower when response selection was
required in the tone response task, but also when the spacing
of the tones was random rather than fixed. The latter finding
supports the hypothesis that input monitoring is part of the
attentional control loop. It may be the case, though, that input
monitoring overlaps more with eye-movement control than with
executive control deployed in mental calculation.
Summarizing the results on input monitoring, it appears that
input monitoring calls on executive attention when controlled
saccades but not when automatic saccades have to be performed.
However, arithmetic performance (simple sums and products)
does not seem to be disturbed by an increased demand to monitor
input. Note however, that these studies tested executive control
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without imposing a WM load. The present evidence therefore
remains indirect and evidence directly involving WM operations
is needed for a more solid support for the role of input monitoring
in the attentional subsystem of WM.
WHAT LINKS SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO EXECUTIVE
CONTROL?
In balance, the evidence reviewed in the previous sections shows
that in many cases selective attention tasks call on working mem-
ory, in particular on its executive attention control mechanism.
However, in a number of situations selective attention operates
without any executive demands (e.g., attentional capture, efficient
visual search, …). The question that must be asked then is how
working memory theory can account for these differences. In
this section, the view is defended that selective attention taxes
executive control depending on the characteristics of the task
being executed. More specifically, the thesis will be developed
that when a task (i.e., a goal-directed activity) is performed, a
means-end representation is instantiated1 in working memory,
also known as a task set, and when this representation includes
attention selectivity as a means to achieve the task goal, and only
then, task executive will call on executive demands. The view
defended by Kim et al. (2005) with pools of modality-specific
resources selectively contributing to content-based interference
is not in contradiction with the present development as both
views continue to build on Baddeley (1986) view on working
memory.
The motivation for developing this view is the considera-
tion that executive control as defined in some WM models
(e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) still has the characteristics of a
homunculus, notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to
fractionate the central executive (Baddeley, 1996a,b, 2000; Miyake
et al., 2000; Vandierendonck et al., 2007). The view developed here
tries to specify the executive control processes in such a way that
these processes are triggered whenever the appropriate conditions
are met, so that no other supervisory control system is needed to
overview proper application of these processes.
Taking into account that a range of studies did not find
any effects of a WM load on task switching (e.g., Logan, 2004,
2006; Kane et al., 2007; Kiesel et al., 2007), while there is evi-
dence showing that task switching calls on executive control
processes (Goschke, 2000; Miyake et al., 2000; Baddeley et al.,
2001; Friedman et al., 2008; Liefooghe et al., 2008), it seems that
task and task-set representation are not competing with memory
tasks for storage, but are competing for control processes. Yet,
execution of a task requires a task set that remains active until
the task is finished or abolished. According to some authors,
whenever a task set becomes active, it is retrieved from long-
term memory, and maintained into an active state in WM (e.g.,
Mayr and Kliegl, 2000). However, if the task set occupies WM
1Although it is often assumed that working memory consists of activated long-
term memory (e.g., Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Oberauer, 2009), others conceive
WM as a temporary working space that is linked to long-term memory but
separate from it. In line with the latter conception, elements stored in WM are
not simply activated; the present model assumes that an instance is encoded
in WM that combines perceived and retrieved features from LTM into a
single trace.
storage space, it is expected that an increased WM load would
impair task-switching performance and would do so even more
when the task sets are more complex. Neither of these seems to
be the case. Hence, if the task set is maintained in WM without
affecting task-switching performance, it must be assumed that
the task set is maintained separately from regular WM contents.
A possible solution is to assume that the task set is maintained
in a dedicated WM system for execution-related information,
an executive working memory module (eWM), whereas regular
WM storage is maintained in a kind of declarative WM module
(dWM; Oberauer, 2009; Vandierendonck, 2012) or an episodic
buffer (Baddeley, 2000) linking phonological and visuospatial
representations to each other and to their long-term memory
representations.
Before executing a new task, the intention to do so is adopted.
This entails activation of a goal representation in WM and the
retrieval of the task set from long-term memory. The goal rep-
resentation is established by instantiating a label (e.g., the task
name) referring to the goal or the task in dWM, and the task
set is retrieved from long-term memory and configured in eWM.
There are several reasons for making the assumption that dWM
contains a reference to the goal. First, research has shown that
other information present in dWM has an effect on task switching
performance; more particularly, supportive information enhances
performance while distracting information impairs performance
in a task switching context (Goschke, 2000; Arrington, 2008).
It may be argued that is at variance with findings that a WM
load does not impair task-switching performance. However, in
the context of task execution (also a memory task), a goal is always
present and would thus always be part of dWM. Second, procedu-
ral knowledge that matches the contents of dWM, including the
goal label, will be selected for execution in order to achieve the
goal.
The task set is loaded in eWM. A task set is a collection of
task-execution parameters that specify and constrain the actions
that can be taken to achieve the task goal (cf. Logan and Gordon,
2001). For the rather simple cognitive tasks as the ones considered
here (situations requiring solving of a new problem or solving
of a complex problem are not considered here, because in such
cases it cannot be assumed that long-term memory contains a
complete task set as the means to attain the goal are not yet
known), the task set will contain a representation of actions
that lead to goal achievement. Other parameters that may be set
during the instantiation of the task set include orientation of
attention towards the relevant stimulus sets, setting a response
threshold (determining speed/accuracy trade-off), maybe also a
response bias, response modality, etc. (see also Vandierendonck
et al., 2010). In this context, it is important to note that every
intentional activity has a goal (represented in dWM) and a task
set (stored in eWM). This implies that an intention to memorize
some events for usage or recall some time later has also such
representations.
Instead of presenting here a complete representation of the
model (see Vandierendonck, 2012, for a more extensive descrip-
tion), a few examples will be elaborated to clarify the operation
of the model. First, the operation of the model is described in
performing a simple short-term memory task with immediate
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serial recall. Next, the model activity is described in performing
a similar memory task with delayed recall, where the reten-
tion interval is filled with the execution of another cogni-
tive task, as in dual-task situations as used in complex WM
span tasks (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980; Turner and Engle,
1989) or in experiments parameterizing the amount of cognitive
load (e.g., Barrouillet et al., 2004). Finally, it will be explained
how the model does or does not call on selective attentional
processing.
IMMEDIATE SERIAL RECALL
As recall is intended, a task goal for intentionally encoding and
maintaining the sequence of events is instantiated in dWM, and
the corresponding task set is configured in eWM. This is a rather
simple task set, as there are no stimulus categorization rules or
response categories. Task-set parameters will be needed to specify
which subset of stimuli must be encoded, whether to use verbal
rehearsal, or to use memory refreshing, whether chunking must
be attempted and how big the chunks should be. Once the task set
is configured, an automatic process continuously checks contents
of dWM and eWM; when a content matches a condition-action
rule in procedural LTM or one of the active task-set rules in eWM,
the rule may be activated and the action specified in the rule is
executed. Because this process continuously checks WM contents
for execution of production rules, it is called the executive loop
(a similar mechanism plays in production-rule models such as
adaptive character of thought (ACT); Anderson and Lebiere,
1998). Each time a new memorandum is presented (e.g., a conso-
nant), it will be encoded in dWM and a rehearsal or refreshment
process will be applied to the new and to the previously presented
memoranda. If necessary and suitable, chunking of memoranda
in dWM may be attempted. This will create a new chunk, a new
entity in long-term memory that contains the elements in their
recorded order (which occasionally may be incorrect), or retrieve
an already existing chunk from long-term memory. An instanti-
ation of the chunk is added to dWM replacing the constituting
elements. The executive loop continues until the recall signal
occurs (or until another goal takes over). From this time on, the
task goal changes from encode-and-maintain to maintain-and-
recall. The goal representation in dWM is updated and the new
task set is stored in eWM. The executive loop continues to run,
but now the conditions have changed such that attention is no
longer applied to incoming stimuli, but instead a retrieval loop
searches dWM for the oldest element from the episode. When the
oldest event is found and it is a chunk, an unpacking process is
started that finds the oldest element within the chunk. Thus the
stored elements are retrieved one by one and sent to the speech
production process. It should be noted that due to the capacity
limitation inherent to dWM, the number of memoranda that can
be recalled in the correct order is limited to about 4–5 when no
chunking is invoked; with chunking the number can be increased
and may result in an average of 7–9 items (3–4 chunks).
SERIAL RECALL WITH FILLED RETENTION INTERVAL
Now a more complex task involving dual tasking is considered.
In this example, a series of letters is presented for serial recall
after a short retention interval at the end of presentation. During
this retention interval, another task, namely parity judgment of
digits must be executed: a series of digits are presented according
to a paced schedule and for each digit a fast manual response
is required categorizing the digit as odd (left key press) or even
(right key press). During, the letter presentation part, basically the
same series of events are taking place as in the previous example
(encoding, rehearsing/refreshing, chunking the presented con-
sonants), but because of the filled delay interval, at the end of
presentation of the memoranda, a stimulus is presented that
announces the requirement to perform another task. Up to that
point, the encode-and-maintain goal is active. Next, dual task-
ing becomes necessary, which implies that two goals must be
served, namely a goal to maintain the sequence of consonants
(maintenance) and a goal to perform the instructed task (e.g.,
parity judgment) in response to the stimulus or stimuli (digits)
presented during this retention period. What actually happens
according to the model is that the presentation of a digit will
(re)activate the parity goal and the task set for categorizing the
digits as odd (left key-press) or even (right key-press). Other
parameters that can be set at task configuration may depend
on the specific instructions given at the start of the experiment
(e.g., response threshold on the basis of requirements for speed
and/or accuracy, the output modality, such as which hands and/or
fingers to use, etc.). Each time a digit is presented (e.g., 4) it is
instantiated in dWM. The executive loop will allow activation of
the association “4-even”; this will result in adding “even” to dWM.
Next, the rule “even-right” will fire, adding “right” to dWM. All
these dWM events (“parity”, “4”, “even”, “right”) will be bound
and result in application of the corresponding task-set rule, which
results in producing a right key-press. The binding is now released
and the elements (“parity”, “4”, “even”, “right”) are no longer
needed and lose their activation. The parity goal is attained, and
control shifts to the other goal (maintenance). This takes some
time (goal-switching cost), but once the maintenance goal and
task set are reactivated, the stored sequence is being rehearsed or
refreshed. This goes until a next digit is presented which triggers
reactivation of the parity goal and task set, or until the recall signal
occurs. At recall, the same processes do occur as described in the
immediate recall example.
Because the intervening activity uses storage facilities of dWM,
on average, retrieval of the sequence of memoranda will become
less efficient. If no chunking is attempted and hence only dWM is
used for storage, this will most likely be the case. However, to the
extent efforts were made during presentation of the memoranda
to chunk them and outsource some of the storage to long-term
memory, the bigger the likelihood that recall will not suffer much.
Because similar series of memoranda and task executions follow
each other, traces of previous task executions will keep some
activity level in WM so as to create interference between present
and past relevant elements. To the extent that such interference
occurs, performance decrements will most likely occur. No doubt,
occasionally such interference may also affect goal representa-
tions, leading to a more important performance failure.
WHEN DOES SELECTIVE ATTENTION ENTER THE PICTURE?
Orientation of attention is encoded within the task set; it is
one of the task-execution parameters/constraints. For example in
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configuring a task set for encoding and maintenance of informa-
tion in an experimental context, the instructions usually specify
where in the environment (e.g., center of the screen) which kind
of memoranda (e.g., words, letters, etc.) will be presented. These
instructions constitute ways to constrain the task set, which is
encoded in the form of parameter settings. In other words, an
intentional memorization task in principle always requires selec-
tive attention such as to encode the stimuli or stimulus aspects
that must remembered and to ignore other ones. Therefore, if
the participants comply with the instructions in the experiment,
a WM load always includes selective attention.
Consider a few examples of a dual-task context. Suppose that
there is a WM load and that during the retention interval a second
task must be performed, for example, a visual search situation as
was used by Anderson et al. (2008): during a WM load, either
an efficient or an inefficient visual search must be performed. As
already explained, a serial WM load engages selective attention
in the memorization task set. The secondary task involves visual
search. This requires a task set that also engages selective attention.
Now, the search occurs in two variations. With efficient search
(find X among L distracters), the X is so different from the
distracters that it pops out. In fact, although the participant is
prepared to selectively attend, the target is found automatically
without effort and without in fact engaging controlled attention.
In contrast, with inefficient search (find T among L), selective
attention is needed and each element has to be checked whether
it fits the target description. This involves control of the order
in which positions are scanned and checking whether the target
is present at that position. In comparison to efficient search, the
action has to be controlled, and this also takes longer. This leaves
less time to revert to the memory maintenance task to refresh the
stored memoranda. For several reasons, then, it is to be expected
that inefficient search interferes with WM whereas efficient search
does not.
As another example, take a dual-task situation in which one
task is intended to tax executive control, with less or more selective
attention, but without memory load, and the other task involves
less or more selective attention. In the review above, one such
experiment compared performance on pro-saccade (eye move-
ment towards a stimulus in peripheral view) and anti-saccade
(eye movement away from peripheral stimulus) tasks, under a
range of conditions meant to tax executive control processes
(Vandierendonck et al., 2008). One contrast of interest is that
between a task where an auditory stimulus either occurs at fixed
intervals or occurs at variable intervals. This difference corre-
sponds to situations with respectively low and high amounts of
input monitoring. When the sounds occur at fixed intervals, a
repetitive response can be programmed that more or less matches
the stimulus rate. In contrast, when the sounds occur at random
intervals, this is not possible and the aural input has to be scanned
for the occurrence of a sound to which a response can then be
programmed. In the latter case, the task set will engage con-
trolled selective attention. However, only when the other task also
engages controlled attention, impairment is expected to occur.
In other words, with a pro-saccade task which is known to be
performed automatically without any need for control processes
(Hallett, 1978; Kristjánsson et al., 2001), the requirement for
less or more input monitoring will make no difference, but in
combination with an anti-saccade task, the presence of a high
level of input monitoring creates a situations in which two tasks
compete for the same resource, and it is expected that a higher
level of input monitoring will make a difference. This is exactly
what was observed in this study.
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS
It can be argued that the view expressed in this modeling reduces
executive control to one single executive function, namely task-
set shifting. The model indeed assumes that the relevant task set
is represented in a dedicated part of the working memory system
(eWM) and that this representation together with the contents of
dWM triggers the processes that result in goal achievement. Does
this mean that processes engaged by other executive functions
such as updating, inhibition, and others (Burgess, 1997; Rabbitt,
1997; Miyake et al., 2000) are excluded by the present view?
They aren’t. For example, it is not at all clear that updating
really is an executive function. Some authors have claimed that
updating is not itself an executive function, but is rather a task
demand, i.e., a requirement imposed by the task to continuously
keep memory contents up-to-date (e.g., Szmalec et al., 2011). If
memory updating is in fact a task demand, there is no doubt that
a task-set representation can serve all what is needed. It seems
evident that when the task is changed, completed or abolished,
the related WM contents are no longer maintained in dWM.
Besides, if the task set itself is no longer needed it will also be
released from eWM. In other words, task changes result in an
updating of the memory contents. A similar argument can be
made for the executive function of inhibition. When particular
memory contents are not useful to task execution, there is no
task set that supports these contents and if they conflict with
task execution, an inhibition process will be applied. Rather than
defending a view based on bundles of processes as expressed in
executive functions that themselves may easily develop into ill-
defined agents or even homunculi, the present view attributes
control to processes that are triggered when particular condi-
tions are met, such as the presence of particular contents in
dWM, the presence of a particular task set in eWM, and a
knowledge base in (procedural) long-term memory that contains
the appropriate rules that connect the conditions to actions or
processes.
SIMILARITIES TO OTHER MODELING ATTEMPTS
The model presented here is not a completely unique effort.
Building on the multicomponent WM model of Baddeley and
et al. (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000), it bor-
rowed the production-rule logic as used in the ACT model
(Anderson and Lebiere, 1998). Like Baddeley’s episodic buffer,
the declarative WM module’s function is not only concerned with
maintaining information in an active state, it is also needed for
binding some of the contents. The present modeling was also
influenced by Barrouillet’s time-based resource sharing model
(Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007). Barrouillet’s model attributes
impaired recall in dual-task situations to the fact that the cen-
tral attentional resource has to be time-shared between memory
refreshments and task execution. This sharing involves rapid
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switching of attention from memory to task and vice versa. In the
present model, the dominant task set determines which activity
or process can be deployed (e.g., memory refreshment vs. parity
judgment, e.g.), and the longer the time spent on executing the
parity task, the less opportunity is left over for memory refresh-
ment. One difference with Barrouillet’s model is that the present
model does not assume rapid switching, but rather assumes
that there is a cost associated with switching between memory
refreshment and execution of another task.
The distinction between declarative and executive WM mod-
ules is reminiscent of Oberauer (2009, 2010) distinction between
declarative and procedural WM. There are a few important dif-
ferences however between Oberauer’s procedural WM (pWM)
module and the executive WM module in the present model.
Whereas pWM is considered to be activated procedural LTM,
and hence essentially contains one or more stimulus-response
mappings, eWM is not the activated part of procedural LTM,
but is instead an autonomous module containing task set infor-
mation, including parameters specifying task execution. While in
Oberauer’s view, dWM and pWM have the same structure and
perform the same kind of actions be it on different contents,
in the present view, there is no analogy in the operation of
dWM and eWM; each module has its own function but their
contents enter a collaborative process to achieve the present
goal.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The evidence regarding a role for WM in selective attention was
reviewed and showed that very often, but not always, a WM
load impaired performance in selective attention tasks. Similarly,
correlational studies showed a relationship between individual
WM capacity and selective attention performance in most but not
all selective attention tasks. A model was presented that provides a
basis for distinguishing selective attention tasks that do and those
that do not interfere with WM. Basically, this model accounts
for this difference by assuming that interference is bound to
occur when both tasks (the WM task and the attention task)
are prepared for attentional selectivity on condition the selective
attention does not occur automatically.
While it would certainly be interesting to know whether WM
(and its executive control mechanism) interact with other atten-
tion contexts than selective attention, the present paper did not
discuss the interactions of executive control with the alerting net-
work (Posner and Petersen, 1990). One reason for not following
up this link concerns the difficulty to design experiments that
are not contaminated by the presence of arousal, because the
alerting network is intricately linked to arousal phenomena, while
executive control in a dual-task context calls on effort which is
also intricately linked to arousal.
Another attention mechanism that recently has gained interest
concerns self-control (Petersen and Posner, 2012). An important
part of research in recent years has indeed been concerned with
aspects of self-control, volition, and the like. As shown by some
studies on task switching, the WM system may provide an excel-
lent substrate for self-control in the form of the phonological
loop (Goschke, 2000; Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson and Miyake,
2003; Miyake et al., 2004; Bryck and Mayr, 2005; Demanet et al.,
2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2012). That there are links between
executive control and self-control is beyond doubt, but should be
the subject of a separate study.
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